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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we consider the possibility of signaling and 
individual's two-stage decision procedures within an asymmetric 
information framework to investigate the brain drain phenomena. The 
results indicate the relationship between an individual's ability and 
the signal he will choose at rational expectations equilibrium. Also, 
the persons who will remain abroad are identified. Where the ranking 
of the universities provides the signal to domestic employers, we can 
therefore interpret these results in such a way that there is an 
association between students of a particular quality and correspcnding 
qualities of universities they will choose to attend to attain 
Ph. D. 's. Moreover, we can predict whether these graduating Ph.D. 's 
choose to return home or remain abroad. 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BRAIN DRAIN 
Da-Hsiang Donald Lien 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although conventional economic theory would treat 
international migrations as analogous to international commodity 
exchange, and hence mutually beneficial, yet in reality there exist 
many reasons to question this proposition. Particularly, persons in 
the source countries complain that too many of the brighter people 
remain abroad, which yields the so-called brain drain problem. 1 
Traditionally, among economic factors, different wage schedules were 
assumed to generate the incentives leading to this problem. 
Nonetheless, a recent study by Kwok and Leland [3] indicated another 
possibility, mainly the asymmetric information structure (i. e. , the 
source country employers cannot observe the abilities of returning 
persons), which can explain the brain drain problem without assuming 
difference in wage schedules. 2 Their results showed that, owing to 
the asymmetric information structure, only lower ability people will 
return to their home countries while higher ability people remain 
abroad. 
In this paper, we further extend Kwok-Leland's framework in 
two directions: (1) the possibility of signaling. (2) the explicit 
considerations of two-stage decision procedures. By (1). we mean 
that. while the source countries may not observe the true ability of 
returning individuals, they may well try to infer it from other 
sources in which case these sources become signals. By (2) , we mean 
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that, before deciding whether to go abroad or not. each individual 
will consider explicitly whether he will return to his home country or 
remain abroad once he has decided to go abroad. The model is descr'ibe 
in Section 2. 
From the model. we derive the properties of feasible rational 
expectations equilibria in Section 3. The results indicate the 
relationship between individual's ability and the signal he will 
choose. As a natural interpretation of the signal would be the 
ranking of all universities (a "lower" signal being equivalent to 
getting a Ph.D. from a lower ranked university), we can therefore 
interpret these results as indicating what types of students will 
choose what levels of universities to pursue their Ph.D. 's, and 
whether they will return home after getting their Ph.D. 's. These 
implications are described in Section 4. 
Warning: since, in reality, the brain drain problem is 
determined by many social factors {l], the conclusions of this paper 
should be treated with caution. 
2 • A SIMPLE MODEL 
Consider a source country, say Taiwan3, endowed with 
individuals graduating from colleges (in Taiwan) with ability 
9 £ [�,9], 0 < � < 0. Knowing his own 9, each individual has to make 
a choice over a e {O} U [@,oo) ,  @ > 0. A choice of a 2. @ for the 9-
ability person will cost c(e,a) where ce < 0, ca > 0, 
cea < 0, caa 2. O. On the other hand, after a-investment is completed. 
A 
his ability will be increased from 9 to 6(9,a) = f(6,a) + u where 
fa > o. r9 > 0, r9a 2. 0, faa � 0, r99 � 0, and u is a random variable 
with finite support [a,b]. 
The interpretations are as follows: "a = 0" represents 
staying and working in Taiwan while "a 2. S" represents going abroad. 
say U. S. A. , to study for Ph.D. _degrees. Furthermore. as a increases, 
he goes to better universities (assuming a is common knowledge). In 
this model, we assume everyone may receive admissions and (finally) 
Ph. D. degrees from any university in U.S.A. However. there will be 
differences in cost terms and ability improvement capacities: (i) 
Smarter persons (with higher 9) pay less cost; (ii) Better 
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universities (with higher a) cost more; (iii) Both higher 9 and higher 
a increase more of the abilities Cin average); (iv) Marginal cost of a 
decreases as a decreases (or 9 increases); (v) Marginal ability 
improvement of a decreases as a increases (or 9 decreases). 
After a-investment is completed, an individual may choose to 
work in U. S.A. or in Taiwan. Assume the wage schedules prevailed in 
both countries are the same: W(O) = 9, when 9 is observable. 
Nonetheless, since in general individuals prefer to live in their home 
country, there is a discount factor 0 < k < 1 which applies to the 
income received from working in U. S.A. Under this assumption. clearly 
everyone from Taiwan would return if his final ability S' is observable 
to both employers. However, asymmetric information structure is now 
imposed. Specifically, because a-investment is made and completed in 
� 
U. S. A. , we assume the individual's 9(9,a) could be perfectly observed 
by U.S. employers. Yet, Taiwanese employers only observe a and pay 
W(a), which is their commom beliefs of the mean ability for those 
returning a-level Ph.D.'s. 
The causes of asymmetric information are mainly of 
institutional characteristics. 4 The assumption that a is common 
knowledge may be justified by the fact that there are censuses 
conducted in U. S. A. about the ranks of universities. Although this 
classification is discrete, to simplify mathematical considerations, 
we assume a is continuous. The reasons for assuming wage schedules 
depend upon a also has some institutional flavors,5 but it may be
A 
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simply that (i) � is unobservable, therefore Taiwanese employers have 
to infer � from some other sources and (ii) a is commonly believed to 
be highly correlated with S'.
Lastly, for those choosing a = 0, we assume Taiwanese 
employers can perfectly observe their ability 9 (i. e. , the only 
imperfect information in this model is knowledge of the ability of 
those returning Ph.D. 's). The model is now complete and we want to 
further study the equilibrium states, which satisfy (1) Each 
individual maximizes his expected net wage income by choosing 
appropriate a and deciding whether to return Taiwan or not thereafter 
(if a L @); and (2) The wage paid by Taiwanese employers to those 
returning a-level Ph. D.'s actually reflects their average ability. As 
in the literatures, this is a typical rational expectations 
equilibrium CREE). 
• 
Mathematically, REE is characterized by a (G) and 
W(a) such that the following two conditions are met: 
(1) Given W(a), a
•
(e) maximizes N(G,a) for every e where N(e,a) is 
the 
net payoff for 9 ability individuals from choosing a. 
<2> f f 
-
9eG(a) ue0{9,a)p(9)g{u)W{a)dud9 
= Saee(a){fue0(9,a);(9,a)g(u)du}Pr{u 8 n (9,a))p(9)d9. V
a} s 
where p(9) is the p.d.f. of 9; g(u) is the p.d.f. of u; 0(a) is 
the set of all possible O's who will choose a; Q(O,a) is the set 
of possible realizations of u such that those persons 
characterized by (9,a) will return to Taiwan. This is a 
"Rational Expectation" condition. In other words, the average 
wage, 'W(a), paid to returning students is "correct," given the 
distribution of those who elect to return. 
3. SOME PROPERTIES OF FEASIBLE REE 
Now, given Wea) with w' (a) }. o. an individual with ability e 
may choose a from the following three different regimes: 
Regime 1: k[f(e,a) +a] }. W(a) 
Here, he never returns Taiwan, and a is thus chosen to 
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maximize N1(e,a) = kE0[fe-O,a) + u] - c(e,a). Assume interior solution 
exists, then the optimal choice of a in this regime, a1(e), satisfies: 
aN1 ( 6.'..."2_ 
aa kf <e.a) - c (e,a) a a 0 • ( 1) 
6 
2 
a N1(e,a) 
aa2 
kfaa(e,a) - caa(6,a) < O • ( 2) 
Regime 2, k[f(e,a) + bl i W(a) 
Contrast to Regime 1, now the individual always returns Taiwan 
after a-investment is completed. Therefore, a is chosen to maximize 
N2(9,a) = W(a) - c(9,a). Assume again interior solution exists, the 
optimal choice of a in the regime, a2Ce), satisfies: 
aNzC.9,a) 
= w' (a) - Ca({),a) aa 0 • 
2 a N2(e,a) _-"--::_ = w 
aa2 
(a) - c ce,a) < 0 • aa 
Regime 3: k[f(e,a) +a] {Wea> ! k[f(e,a) + b] 
(3) 
( 4) 
Now, depending upon the realization of u, the individual may 
remain in U.S.A. or return Taiwan. Specifically, if 
Wea> 2 k[f(e,a) + u], or equivalently u { � - f(e,a), he will 
return Taiwan; otherwise he will remain in U.S.A. Therefore, by 
choosing a in this regime, he tries to maximize 
N3<e,a) = Pr[u � Wka) - r<e,a) lw(a) 
+ Eu[k(f(6,a) + u)(u 2 Wka) - f(e,a)l - c(e,a) 
a(w�al _ rc0,al Jw<al 
b + J_ k(f(0,a) + u)g(u)du - c(9,a) 
l!.i!!.L f ( 0 a) k ' 
where G(.)[resp. g(·)] is the probability distribution [resp. 
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( 5) 
density] function of u. Assume interior solution exists, the optimal 
choice of a in this regime, a3(0), satisfies: 
aN3(-9.'._'.'�. G[WLa) - f(0,a)]\i' (a) aa 
+ kfa(0,a) j 1 - a(W�al - f(0,a)J ) - ca(0,a) 
2 a N3(0,a) 
•• 
2 a[w\a> _ rc0.al Jw" Cal 
+ ks[w<al _ rc0 a ll cw' Cal _ 
k ' j k 
2 fa(0,a)) 
0 (6) 
+ kfaa(0,a) \ 1 - a(wckal - f(e,a) J l- caa(e,a) < O (7) 
From the above considerations, the final optimal choice of 
• • 
a e [@.�) will be a (9) e £a1(0), a2(0), a3(0)}, assuming a (-0) is the 
interior solution for some regimes.6 Given this, a person will be 
• said to be of type i iff he sets a (-0) = ai(9), i = 1, 2, 
3. 
Obviously, type 1 persons will never return while type 2 persons will 
A always return and type 3 persons observe the realizations of 9 (or u) 
to determine whether to return or not. 
L 1: If o1• 
a2 and o3 all correspond to the same a, where e1 
8 belongs to type !, i � 1, 2, 3, then (i) �2 i e3 i e1, (ii) 
A A 
0(01,a) � 0(02,al with probability 1. 
L 2: Given 93, if there exists 91 or e2 such that they correspond 
to the same a, where 01 belongs to type i, then kfa(93,a) { W1Ca), 
Lemma 3: 
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(1) At Rational Expectations Equilibrium, if 0 belongs to type 
(ii) 
(iii) 
Lemma 4: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
2 and w'
. (a) .{ 0 for all a, then «2(-0) 2- «3(-0). 
Assume W', (a) t. O, if 0 belongs to type 3 such that 
«3C ei • a2C9') =a (-0') for some 0', then 
a2(0) 2 a3(0) 2 a1(e), 
If 9 belongs to type 3 such that a3(0) = a1C0'' )
for some 9'', then a1(0) i a3Ce) i a2Ca).
da1 ( 0) d-0 2 0, 1/0; 
da2(0) 
�1 0, 1/0; 
da3(0) ) 
� = O if and only if 
( 
a·ce••) 
9 
w' (a) 
< kr0.ce,a)•[l - G(� - f(0,alll + c0.ce,a) - kfa(9,a) = ( 8 )  
[� _ f(0,a)Jf0(e,a) g k 
(The Proofs of Lemma 1 - 4 are presented in the Appendix.) 
Given the above results, assume W'' (a) i O, the only rational 
expectations equilibrium where three types of persons coexist9 can be 
shown as Figure 1, of which Band C (also, D and E) correspond to the 
same a. Other configurations, such as ''U" shape or downward sloping 
curve within type 3 will violate Lemma 3. Nevertheless, as a special 
case. if W<a> is a constant function, then W1Ca> = o < kr0ca3,a), 
Y03, and hence there is no overlapping a across different types (by 
Lemma 2). Furthermore, the relationship between 9 and a is continuous 
and monotonically increasing as shown in Figure 2. 
Although existence of equilibrium wage schedules of the form 
of Figure 1 has not been shown in general, for certain cases, such 
schedules can be shown to exist. Mathematically, the equilibrium wage 
schedule Wea) associated with Figure 1 may be solved from the 
following differential equations system: 
(1) rce2,a)p(e2J + Eu[rce3,al + ulu >. W�al - rce3,a) l 
- a[wcka> - rce3.•>J - pCe3> 
[pC02l + p(03)G[W(ka) - f(03,all]W(a), Va� S 
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(2) w' (a) C0(92,a); 
(3) a[w�al _ rce3,al ]w' <a> 
+ kr.ce3,a> \ 1 - a[w�al - rce3,ai] ) " c.ce3,a>. 
As an example, Assume (i) c(a,a) = c0 + c1 e + c2a + c3ea with c9 < 0, 
00 > 0, c90 = c3 < O; (ii) f(9,a) = 9 + &a, & > 0; (iii) u is 
uniformly distributed over [-b,b]; (iv) the distribution of 9 is 
uniform over [�.61. Then, it can be shown that if 9 2 (kO - c2)/c3, 
• a1(e) =a Ce)= m; otherwise, if 9 < (k& - c2)/c3, then only the 
boundary points in Regime 1 will matter. Also, type 2 and type 3 
persons' choices are characterized, respectively, by: 
Cz + C392 "' w' (a) 
03 w
' (a) - k& [b - 0 \iiJ!l 2b(&a - c2)JuQ + k + -----w' (a) - k& w' (a) - k& + 2bc3 
On the other hand, REE will require: 
o2 + &a + 
- ) 
+ &a + u itl!!l__93_&a �---- du s k 2b -b 
iw_e3-&a 1 f k 2bdu -b 
" weal x [1 lilJU_e3-&a 1 d 1+ J k 2b u • -b 
( 9) 
(10) 
( 11) 
a
I 
type zl ty 
I 
I 
po 3 I type 1 
D 
�!, v
I 
F 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
,,__ I 
I 
I __ _ 
0 
Figure 1 
a
Q 
I 
type 3 I type 1 
I / !/ 
/  
I 
I 
,,__ ___ , ____ _ 
0 
Figure i 
Q 
Substituting eqs. (9) and (10) into (11). after algebraic 
manip ulations. we have 
w' (a) - c2 1 [¥r- iiru_cw' ca>+ k 6u + --0--� + 4b 3 (2by 
w' (a) 
- k6)12 
- k6 + 2bc3 
x [ll.W. 2bk - 2by + ivtl.cw' <a> - ks>] 
2b(ii' (a) - k6 + 2bc3) 
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= ii<a> x (1 + 11.W. 2bk - 2by + ¥cw' <a> - k&>] 
2b(W• (a) - k6 + 2bc3) 
(12) 
where r = k6 - c2 + c3C&a - b). Note that, given finite a, if 
w' (a} 4 ± ...  then Wea) 4 +.:o. Also. if there exist possibilities such 
that w' (a) 4 k6 - 2bc3. then eq. (12) reduces to 2by + w1a)(-2bc3) 
i<.ru._ k6 - 02 1 
= O => k = ..::L "" + 6a - b � W (a) ""' k6, which leads to a C3 03 
contradiction. Therefore, by specifying the initial condition f'or 
WC a). we can expand \i(a) pointwisely from eq. (12), i.e., the 
solutions for eq. (12) exist. 
4, IMPLICATIONS 
From Figure 1, we may find that, within the same level 
universities, there may exist three types of students. Those who 
decided to remain (before observing the realization of u) have higher 
prior ability Ce) than those who decided to return Taiwan (before 
observing the realization of u). Furthermore, whatever the 
realizations of u may be, the former group always has higher final 
A 
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abilities (e) than the latter one (by Lemma 1). Also. within type 3, 
-• 
as 9 increases, a also increases, which implies 0 � W (a) 
- kfa(e,a) � �for some constant � (by Lemma 2 and 4). Therefore, 
there will be both an upper bound and a lower bound for w' (a).
However, unlike Figure 2, since a affects the wage income, it 
possesses signal values. (This can be seen from Lemma 3 where given 
9, if the probability to return Taiwan increase. then a should also 
increase). Hence. lower ability people will have more incentives to 
exploit these values. particularly type 2 persons will exploit more of 
these values through the externalities provided by type 3 persons. 
More importantly. as shown in Figure 1 or 2. there will be a 9 
(or. equivalently, an a) such that all the persons with ability higher 
that e (or. all the persons attend universities with ranks higher than 
a) will never return. This means. the best persons will never return 
Taiwan which may be the most serious brain drain problem. On the 
other hand, for type 3 persons. only those with worse realizations of 
A 
u (or 9) will return Taiwan while the others remain. This constructs 
another brain drain problem which was indicated by Kwok-Leland [3]. 
Finally. as a remark. note that there are several ways to 
increase wage incomes in this model. For those lower ability type 2 
person, they simply use the signal values of a and exploit the 
externalities provided by type 3 persons. Type 3 persons, however, 
13 
can only exploit the advantages from asymmetric information structure 
by which externalities are thus introduced. As for type 1 persons. 
they will only use their high ability levels to increase wage incomes, 
foregoing the asymmetric information structure. 
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FOOTNOTES 
• I am grateful to Richard McKelvey for long helpful discussions. to 
Leonid Hurwicz and Joel Sobel for constructive suggestions, to 
Robert Bates and James Quirk for valuable comments on an earlier 
draft. Of course, all errors remain mine. 
1. From the host country aide, the influx of unskilled immigrants 
(legal or illegal) is said to distort the labor mar�et and delay 
technological innovations [S]. 
2. By assuming opposite asymmetric information structure (i.e.> the 
uninformed agents are those in the host countries), Katz-Stark [2] 
generated the conclusion that only lower ability people will go 
abroad. As shown in their papers, it seems that they were dealing 
with different issues. Specifically, Kwok-Leland considered brain 
drain problem while Katz-Stark dealt with unskilled immigrants. 
Nevertheless both papers indicated the importance of asymmetric 
information structure in international migrations studies [4]. 
3. Although Taiwan was selected by Kwok-Leland to justify the 
assumption of the same wage schedules (which, more or less, raises 
some objections), yet here it was selected since more 
institutional characteristics could be provided. 
4. If a Ph.D. tries to enter U.S. job markets> interviews, job talks 
and recommendation letters, etc. will be required. However, if he 
applies a job in Taiwan (from U.S.A.), interviews or job talks 
usually won't be conducted. Although recommendation letters or 
samples of research work might be requested, yet due to lack of 
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connections and gaps of academic research levels (i.e • •  for 
example. some new ideas which are highly appreciated in U.S.A. may 
by still unfamiliar to Taiwanese academic circles). their values 
as references to abilities will be seriously reduced. Hence, U.S. 
employers have much more information about job candidates' 
abilities to access while Taiwanese employers are poorly informed. 
As an extreme case, we assume the abilities are perfectly observed 
by U.S. employers, yet Taiwanese employers have no information at 
all. 
S. I have been told some economic research institutes pay the 
salaries according to which universities the employees get Ph.D. 
from. Also, an oversea job candidate list circulated in Taiwan 
includes only the following information: sex. age, degrees from 
which universities and expected salaries> etc. Although further 
information may be acquired. yet the school ranking still plays 
important roles in the first step of recruition procedures. On 
the other hand, the special case when W°(a) is a constant function 
is also studied in Section 3. 
6 .  Any boundary solution> except u*ce> = @, can only appear in the 
interaction points of type frontiers. For example, if a* (6) is 
the boundary solution for type 1, then it must be that the 
individual with ability 9 is indifferent between being type 1 or 
type 3. Therefore, the relationship of 9 and o. will be continuous 
at this "type" intersection point> i.e. C = F in Figure 1 (assume 
every type 3 person always has unique maximum point). Note that, 
16
if there is also 0' < a such that the individual with ability 9' 
is indifferent between being type 2 or type 3, then B also equals 
E in Figure 1 which renders the figure the same as Figure 2 .
Therefore, if a•ca> is never a boundary solution. then Figure 1
will be established and this is a particular property that the 
assumption of W(a) = constant cannot generate. 
7. Alternatively, we may only deal with type 3, and then those type 3 
people who will never return to Taiwan become "type 1" persons 
while those type 3 people who always return become "type 2." 
8 .  If there are several different ability levels. say, a31, 032 
93n' such that 031 belongs to type 
3 for all i and they all 
correspond to the same a, then the following property holds: 
931 2. 63j' iff the probability for 93i to return Taiwan is lower 
than or equal to that of a3j.
9. There exists another possibility for the REE where three types of 
persons coexist, i.e., when a3Ca) and e display "t\" shape. 
However. in this case, there will be some low level universities 
which only very smart students attend. Obviously, this phenomenon 
deems unreasonable. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1: Since W(a) { k[f{-91,a} + a], W(a) l k[fCe2,a) + b] 
and k[fCe3,a) + a] i Wea> i k[f(e3,a) + b], it can be easily shown 
A A e2 i e3 i e1 and r(e1,al 2 r<e2.aJ + (b - al '9 e<e1.a) £ e<e2,aJ with 
A 
probability 1. since a { u { b and 6(-0,a) = f(-9,a) + u. 
Proof of Lemma 2: If 01 exists, then kfa(e1,a)
a(wka> _ r<e3.a>Jw' <•l
+ kr0(e3.0){1 - a[wL•> - ne3 •• J Ji 
ca<e1,a) and 
co.(63.a) 
=} k[fa<e1,a) - fa(93,a)] + [ca(e3,a) - ca(91,a)]
cif(al - kr0(e3,a)]G[w(ka) - r<e3,a)J 
� W' Ca) L kfa(63,a>. since fae 2. a, cae � o and e1 2 e3 • 
-· 
Q.E.D. 
(All 
Similarly, if e2 exists, then W {a) cace2,a> and (Al) hold which
imply 
(1 - a[wkal - ne3,a)J](w' (a) - kr0(e3,a>l ca(e2,a) - ca(e3,a>
18 
� w' (a) 2 kf4(e3,a), since c94 5._ 0 and e3 .= 92 ,
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 3: Note that , at REE, every type 2 person must be 
supported by (at least) one type 3 person with 9' 2 9, where 9 is the 
ability of type 2 person, 9' is the ability of corresponding type 3 
person. By Lemma 2, we have W' (a) 2. kfa.(-0' ,a) � W
' (a) 2. kfa(-0,a),
since r9a 2. 0 and 9' 2 9 (by Lemma 1). Now,
aN2(&,al
aa 
aN3 (a.al 
aa 
rw' (a) - kf.(Q,a)] • (1 - a[ii\a) - f(&,a) li } 0
ON3Ce,a)Hence when aa 
aN2<&,al 0, aa 2 O '9 a2Ce> 2 a3(9) since
_ . . 
(A2l 
\I (a) >. 0, If 9 belongs to type 3, (A2) directly applies if there
• exists 9' or a•• such that a3(.0) = a2('9') = a (-0') or a3Ce) = a2ce••)
• 
= a ce·.). On the other hand, 
aN1 (9,a)
aa 
aN3<&.al
aa fkf0(&,al - 1a[W<kal - f(&,a>] ' o 
aN3(&,a)when the above assumption holds. Hence, when aa 
aN1(&,alo. au 
f o � a1Ce) � a3Ce). Combining the above results, we have u1(e) 
i. •3(&) i. •2(Q) • 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 4: Applying comparative statics to eqs. (1), (3). and 
(6). the results will then be established, since c9a < O (by
assumption) • 
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